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ple plates being sent between houses, 
often reciprocated by the recipient’s 
typical food, or some sweets. 
Music constituted another sphere 
of inter-communal mixing. Jews were 
particularly prominent in the musical 
arts from the nineteenth century, as 
instrumentalist, singers, composers, 
and cafe and cabaret owners. The Iraqi 
delegation to the Arab Music Congress 
in Cairo in 1932 consisted of Jewish in-
strumentalists and one Muslim singer. 
The first orchestra of Iraqi national 
broadcasting in 1936 was predominantly Jewish. One of the most fa-
mous divas of the middle decades of the century was Salima Murad, a 
Jewess who converted to Islam to marry another famous singer, Nazim 
al-Ghazzali. Iraqi Jews in Israel have maintained their devotion to Iraqi 
music into the second and third generations, and Iraqi Jews in London 
import those musicians for their weddings and celebrations. I recall an 
occasion some years ago when a group of Iraqi Jewish musicians from 
Israel arriving in London to perform at a wedding were invited to the 
home of another Iraqi Jew for an evening with a prominent Muslim 
Iraqi musician who then lived in London. They were all friends in Bagh-
dad in the old days, and it was an emotional reunion. They played and 
sang together well into the night.
Communal boundaries
The picture so far may appear a rosy one of friendly inter-communal 
interaction and cosmopolitanism. In fact most people, especially the 
poorer classes, were enveloped in their family and community lives, 
and the ritual calendar of their religion. Communal identities were 
never forgotten, and the boundaries may have been lowered for some, 
but never eliminated. Intermarriage across religious boundaries was 
strictly taboo, and on the rare occasion on which it occurred (always 
the non-Muslim partner converting to Islam) was considered a great 
disaster for the families concerned. Boundaries are not necessarily lo-
cations of conflict, but they can become so when politicized, as they 
were in the course of the twentieth century. Arab nationalism, even 
when secular, drew heavily upon religious-communal sentiments. In 
this perspective Jews (and Christians) were associated with hostile co-
lonial powers, and for Jews, the Zionist movement and Israel.
Iraqi politics under the Monarchy (displaced in 1958) consisted of var-
ious fronts of accommodation and opposition to a government close 
to British interests, and to the West in the Cold War. The ideological 
opposition was divided between the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and 
Arab nationalist groups. The Arab nationalists (in various parties, culmi-
nating in the Baath) tended to be recruited predominantly (though not 
exclusively) from Sunni Arabs. The ICP, which had solid popular constit-
uencies, appealed to the whole spectrum of the Iraqi population: Arabs 
and Kurds, Sunna and Shia, Christians and Jews. Quite apart from its 
ideology and pro-Soviet allegiance, it was an “Iraqist” and cosmopoli-
tan party. Jews, for the most part, avoided open involvement in politics 
where they were particularly vulnerable. But many young people, intel-
ligentsia, but also artisans, were attracted by the prospect of participa-
tion in a secular, universalist, and liberationist movement. Communist 
Jews, some of whom attained leadership positions, were to share in the 
sacrifices and persecutions of their comrades, and the political prisons 
became another arena of everyday cosmopolitanism.
Arab nationalist and Islamic sentiments and movements assumed 
markedly anti-Jewish positions and actions during the 1930s and 
1940s, reinforced with the foundation of Israel in 1948. The 1936 Arab 
revolt in Palestine and the continuing confrontations with Jewish set-
tlers there, led Arab nationalists to see all Jews as complicit. The Rashid 
Ali coup d’état in 1941 was anti-British and pro-Nazi, and though short-
lived, presided over an intensification of anti-Jewish aggression, culmi-
nating in a “pogrom,” known as the Farhud, targeting the Jews of Bagh-
dad and some other cities, during which some 200 Jews were killed 
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The history of the Jewish presence in 
Iraq is often forgotten, erased by mu-
tually hostile nationalisms, Arabist and 
Zionist. A consideration of that history 
and of the embeddedness of the Jews 
in Iraqi society and culture presents 
an interesting reminder of the every-
day cosmopolitanism that pervaded 
Iraqi urban (and some rural) society 
for much of the twentieth century. 
This everyday cosmopolitanism is here 
traced in various spheres and fields of 
general social life as well as profession-
al activities. These relations across communal boundaries were subject 
to the impacts of the political and ideological episodes of the century: 
WWII, pan-Arab nationalism and pro-Nazi movements, the Communist 
movement and Jewish participation, and Zionism and the ultimate 
foundation of Israel.
Social mingling
With the foundation of the modern Iraqi state (British Mandate 1920; 
Independence 1932) Christian and Jewish individuals were well placed 
to participate in the emerging public life in government services, the 
professions, the arts, journalism, and business. Missionary schools and 
the Alliance Israelite Universelle established schools in Baghdad and 
other main cities in the course of the nineteenth century, educating 
their pupils in European languages and modern curricula. This partici-
pation led to the fostering of organic relations between individuals 
and families from different communities, in business and professional 
relations, friendships, and social mingling. Even in rural areas, Jewish 
doctors assumed vital roles in community life and service, and Jewish 
landlords, acquiring land after the Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth 
century, assumed paternal relations to their tenants and employees, to 
the extent of organizing Husseiniya ceremonies in the Shia mourning 
month of Muharram.
Women were often the most active and curious in social interactions 
of neighbourhood and female society. In oral accounts and written 
memoirs, the theme recurs of women moving easily between houses 
in mixed neighbourhoods, exchanging gossip and cooking recipes, as 
well as telling and commiserating over the many common matrimonial 
and domestic problems. They also participated in each other’s festivi-
ties and occasions, exchanging greetings and items of food on their re-
spective religious festivals of Eid, Purim, and Christmas. Jewish women 
in Shia neighbourhoods would sometimes join 
their neighbours on balconies and doorways to 
watch the mourning processions for the martyrs 
in Muharram. Women were also more receptive 
to religious intercession from whatever source to 
solve personal problems of fertility, health, wealth, 
and happiness. One such is the shrine of Shaykh 
Abdel-Qadir al-Gailani in Baghdad, known for its 
efficacy in solving problems of fertility, which was 
frequented by Jewish and Christian women.
Food constituted an interesting cultural field 
of interaction between individuals of different 
communities. The barriers of food taboos were 
transcended among friends, either by non-ob-
servance or by special provisions. From personal recollections, Muslim 
hosts would insure that their table included fish and vegetables for their 
Jewish guests who may observe Casher (Kosher) prohibitions, and Shia 
diners would ignore the taboo on commensality with non-Muslims ob-
served in many Shia communities but ignored in mixed urban contexts. 
While most of the cuisine of each community represented variations on 
common themes of Middle East cooking, there were dishes specific to 
each, such as the Jewish Sabbath dish. In Baghdad this was a special 
chicken and rice dish cooked slowly overnight, known as tebit. Neigh-
bours, attracted by the aromas, had their curiosity satisfied with sam-
The current image of Iraq in the media and 
public discourse is of a country sharply 
divided by communal boundaries and 
conflicts of religion, ethnicity, and community. 
This image goes right against any notion 
of “cosmopolitanism.” Yet, research into 
the history of the country in the twentieth 
century would show that, while communal 
boundaries and conflicts did exist, these 
were socially permeable, allowing much close 
interaction between individuals, families, and 
neighbourhoods across the boundaries.
The barriers of 
food taboos were 
transcended among 
friends …
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classes. In these milieus, communal boundaries were lowered, and 
common mixing, friendships and partnerships flourished for much of 
the twentieth century. Yet, it was those cosmopolitan middle classes 
who fell victim to repeated campaigns of repression and expulsion. 
First, the Jews, who constituted a considerable tranche of the edu-
cated, professional, and business classes, were forced to leave. Then, 
during the 1970s and 80s, many Shia communities were subject to dis-
appropriation and expulsion by the Saddam regime. Waves of political 
repression and persecution decimated the ranks of the intelligentsia, 
many killed and others in prison and exile. Repeated wars and devas-
tation, followed by the UN sanctions, led to the impoverishment and 
humiliation of those classes and heightened pressures which drove 
many into exile.
The violence and disorder which followed the 2003 invasion in-
cluded campaigns of assassination and kidnapping targeting profes-
sionals, including doctors, scientists, and professors, leading to a mass 
flight of these classes into exile. Iraq, then, has been largely denuded 
of the main carriers of everyday, as well as cultural, cosmopolitanism. 
The raging communal violence has also led to the ethnic cleansing of 
neighbourhoods, leading to greater homogeneity, and the erection of 
communal barriers, sometimes physically in the form of walls of sepa-
ration. Christians, and other religious minorities have been particularly 
targeted and many driven into exile or internal displacement. What re-
mains of Iraqi cosmopolitanism may now be found in London or Paris, 
and possibly Amman.
As for the cosmopolitanism of the Middle East more generally, can 
we see a waning of the ethnic and communal interactions of the ear-
lier twentieth century? Certainly, the convergence of nationalism with 
Islamism which seems to prevail increasingly in many countries has led 
to a homogenization of populations and regions, and accelerated mi-
grations of religious minorities to the West, after the almost complete 
ending of the Jewish presence in the region outside of Israel. What of 
globalization: does it lead to a new cosmopolitanism, or to added bar-
riers generated by sharpened transnational nativist and religious ide-
ologies?
and many injured and raped; a traumatic event in collective 
Jewish memory. British forces soon re-occupied Baghdad 
and restored the Monarchy. During this episode many Jews 
were protected by their Muslim neighbours and friends, es-
pecially in the provinces, where a traditional sense of mutual 
obligations was particularly strong.
At the level of everyday relations ideological antipathies 
did not always inhibit friendships and associations. Nazi 
propaganda was prevalent in schools, especially espoused 
by Palestinian and Syrian teachers. A Jewish informant, who 
was at school in the late 1930s, relates walking hand in hand 
with his Muslim classmate in the street, the latter using the 
other hand to write on the wall with a piece of chalk “kill the 
Jews”! This same informant was in a political prison in the 
1940s, as a communist, when a visiting high level medical 
inspector astonished the guards by stopping to greet him 
since they had been at school together.
Iraqi Jews had an ambivalent and shifting attitude to Zion-
ism. Zionist emissaries sent into Iraq with the British forces 
during WW2 were disappointed with the apathy and even 
hostility of the local Jews, whom they decried in their re-
ports as not proper Jews, integrated into “oriental” society, 
immersed in the pastimes and vices of their milieu: sitting 
around in cafes, drinking Arak, gossip, and gambling. Yet, as the Jews 
felt the increasing pressure and discrimination in the later 1940s, Is-
rael and Zionism acquired greater attraction. For some, mostly young, 
the pull was ideological and attraction to the prospect of a western 
lifestyle and full citizenship. For others it was the push of persecution, 
loss of jobs, and arbitrary rule. In the end these pressures and attrac-
tions culminated in the emigration of the great majority of Jews, some 
120,000, mostly to Israel in 1951, in accordance with a secret agree-
ment between Iraqi leaders and the Jewish Agency which allowed Jews 
to leave without their possessions, on condition that they renounce 
their Iraqi nationality. A few thousands remained in Iraq, and some en-
joyed a period of calm and prosperity in the years of the Qasim regime 
(1958–63), only to be subjected to further pressure under the Arabist 
and Baathist regimes of the 1960s, culminating in a wave of persecu-
tion and terror following the 1967 Arab defeat, then the Baathist coup 
of 1968 which brought Saddam and a bloodier regime to power. The 
bulk of the remaining Jews left as soon as they could after that.
Nation-state formation
Iraq is now seen as the epitome of violent sectarianism. A common 
assumption is that this state of affairs is in the nature of the country, 
being an “artificial” creation, forcing together diverse communities 
who cannot coalesce into a “nation.” Most modern nations, however, 
started as artificial mixes, and it is the process of nation-state forma-
tion itself which creates various forms of the “national” at the socio-
economic and cultural levels. Iraq was no exception. The account of 
“everyday cosmopolitanism” given here shows elements of this nation-
al formation and the lowering of communal barriers for much of the 
twentieth century, especially with regard to the ambiguous position of 
the Jews in relation to this “national.” The present situation is the prod-
uct of the disruptive processes unleashed by the Saddam regime, its 
extraordinary repressions and disastrous wars, and exacerbated by the 
American invasion of 2003.
It may be argued that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Iraq was not unambiguously an “Arab country.” Quite apart from the 
sizeable Kurdish population, the “Arab” component participated in a 
highly hybrid culture with echoes of the Turko-Iranic world. Nowruz, 
the spring festival of the Iranic world, was widely celebrated in many 
communities. Iraqi Arabic was, and remains to a certain extent, imbued 
with Persian and Turkish vocabulary. In the 1970s Saddam Hussein 
found it necessary to issue an order banning “foreign” words and ex-
pressions in Iraqi songs. It was the national state, Arab nationalist for 
the most part, which made Iraq into an “Arab country” in the course of 
the twentieth century. This project was also part of the mass national 
education, then government bureaucracy, all in standard Arabic. Yet, all 
these policies and processes never fully succeeded in eliminating the 
pervasive hybridity of Iraqi culture.
At the same time, the national state and its fields spawned orienta-
tions, spaces, and institutions for the flourishing of a different kind of 
cosmopolitanism, that of the intelligentsia and the educated middle 
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